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PHILOSOPHY AND THE
CONSTITUTION
The Constitution is one of the great achievements of political philosophy; and it may be the only political achievement of philosophy in our society. The Framers of the
Constitution and the leading participants in the debates
on RATIFICATION shared a culture more thoroughly than did
any later American political elite. They shared a knowledge (often distorted, but shared nevertheless) of ancient
philosophy and history, of English COMMON LAW, of recent

English political theory, and of the European Enlightenment. They were the American branch of the Enlightenment, and salient among their membership credentials
was their belief that reasoned thought about politics could
guide them to ideal political institutions for a free people.
They argued passionately about the nature of SOVEREIGNTY,
of political REPRESENTATION, of republicanism, of CONSTITUTIONALISM; and major decisions in the ferment of
institution-building that culminated in 1787 were influenced, if never wholly determined, by such arguments.
The final form of the new federal Constitution embodied
radically new views about the location of sovereignty—
now located ‘‘in the people’’ in a stronger sense than any
philosopher except Jean-Jacques Rousseau would have
recognized—and about the function of the SEPARATION OF
POWERS and BICAMERALISM.
Philosophy has never again played the role it played at
the founding of the Republic, except perhaps in inspiring
some ABOLITIONIST CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY. To be sure,
‘‘philosophy’’ in a loose sense has always influenced politicians and judges, who are part of society. The Supreme
Court in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
expressed in its decisions a laissez-faire ‘‘philosophy’’ compounded of Darwinism, a version of NATURAL RIGHTS theory, and conservative economic beliefs. When the Court
abandoned that ‘‘philosophy,’’ they adopted another, more
progressivist and pragmatic, and more attuned to, though
at most only loosely connected with, the renascent empiricism among academic philosophers. Occasionally, the
Court has adverted to specific philosophical doctrines,
from JOHN MARSHALL in FLETCHER V. PECK (1810) to GEORGE
H. SUTHERLAND in UNITED STATES V. CURTISS-WRIGHT EXPORT
CORP. (1936) (on the necessary existence of sovereign
power). Individual Justices like OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
may have been influenced by philosophical reading and
by contact with professional philosophers. But, on the
whole, while ‘‘philosophy’’ has had an influence, philosophy has had little—except to the extent that the ‘‘philosophy’’ of the present is always shaped in part by the
philosophy of the past. (The decreased influence of philosophy has not lessened the relevance of philosophical
issues.)
There are a number of reasons for the decreased influence of philosophy. In the open society the Framers
helped to create, their style of argument, dependent on a
relatively homogeneous and classically educated elite,
could not maintain its political importance. Also, political
philosophy itself became less unified. Widely divergent
views were united under the umbrella of the Enlightenment by common opposition to entrenched privilege
and hieratic religion. Once common enemies were vanquished, philosophical comrades parted company.
Another reason for the decreased influence of philos-
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ophy is that philosophy admits of no binding authorities,
while law does, and does essentially. The Framers were
creating a new political system. No one since then, except
to some extent the RECONSTRUCTION Congresses, has had
that luxury. Later contributors to our constitutional development have always had to interpret, and to attempt to
maintain at least the appearance of continuity with, what
has gone before.
Curiously, while recent philosophical thinking has had
little discernible influence on constitutional law, the reverse is not true. The decisions of the WARREN COURT and
the public discussion they generated certainly contributed, probably significantly, to the revival of interest
among American philosophers in social and political questions, a revival that became apparent in the CIVIL RIGHTS
era of the 1950s and 1960s and that is still in full flower.
Whatever the influence or lack of it of philosophy on
constitutional law, philosophical discussion among academic constitutional lawyers may have reached greater intensity in the 1980s than at any time since the 1780s.
Constitutional law, like law in general, raises deep and
perplexing philosophical questions. The questions that
arise most immediately are questions of political philosophy, and of these the one that has generated most discussion is what is known as the ‘‘antimajoritarian difficulty’’:
how can it be appropriate for the enormously consequential power of JUDICIAL REVIEW to be vested ultimately in
nine individuals who are not chosen by the people and
who are not politically accountable to anyone at all? The
problem is especially vexing when the Court, in the space
of three decades, has outlawed SEGREGATION, forbidden
religious activity in the public schools, required REAPPORTIONMENT of the state legislatures and local government,
created a constitutional code of CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, established a right to abortion, and found in the EQUAL PROTECTION clause a command that government shall not
engage in SEX DISCRIMINATION.
There are three principal types of answer to the question how a democratic society can countenance such judicial power. The first answer, and the natural answer for
any lawyer, is the claim that the Supreme Court has this
power because the Constitution says it does. But the Constitution does not say that, at least not explicitly. The
power of judicial review is nowhere explicitly granted.
Now, in a sense, the lawyer’s answer is still right. The Constitution as it has been interpreted from 1803 to the present does create the power of judicial review. The propriety
of some form of judicial review is disputed by no one.
Even so, it is noteworthy that at the very foundation of
American constitutional law we encounter the problem of
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION.
Given a document, and given agreement that its commands are to be put into practice by legal institutions, how
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do we decide what it commands? How do we decide what
it means? Neither the words alone nor anything we know
about the writers’ intentions is likely to answer straightforwardly all the questions time will bring forth. For that
matter, is it the document we are primarily concerned to
interpret, or the political and doctrinal tradition proceeding from the document that we are concerned to interpret
and to continue? And how are interpretation and continuation related?
It is important to distinguish between the document
and the tradition and to ask how our commitments to each
are interrelated. For example, we are firmly committed,
by our allegiance to the tradition, to certain DOCTRINES,
such as the effective application of the BILL OF RIGHTS to
the states and of the equal protection clause to the federal
government, which can be deduced from the document
only by extremely generous canons of interpretation.
Some argue that if we are committed to these doctrines,
then we must accept and continue to apply those generous
canons. But that conclusion does not follow at all. Law,
like any tradition, can sanctify mistakes.
The problem of interpretation does not arise only at
the stage of justifying judicial review. It arises also at every
application of judicial review. What is the Court to do with
this power? The lawyerly answer, and again clearly the
right answer in some sense, is that the Court should enforce the Constitution. But once more, how do we decide
what the Constitution means?
The lawyerly exponent of judicial review also invites,
by appealing to the Constitution, the most fundamental
question: why do we care about the document or the tradition at all? It may be that to ask this question is to go
beyond the domain of the lawyer as lawyer; but lawyers
and judges are people, and every person who bears allegiance to the document or the tradition must face this
question. Note, however: even though all lawyers and
judges must face this question of political philosophy in
deciding whether to carry out their roles, it does not follow
that they must also appeal to substantive political philosophy in the course of carrying out their roles. Whether
they must do that, and whether they could avoid doing
that if they tried, are further issues.
The difficulties with the lawyerly justification and exposition of judicial review have prompted two other main
theories of judicial review. In one theory, judicial review
is justified by the need to protect individual rights against
infringement by majoritarian government. Exponents of
this theory have drawn heavily on a neo-Kantian strain of
contemporary American political philosophy in attempting to elucidate individual rights and the limits of the majority’s legitimate power. In the other theory, judicial
review does not purport to limit but merely to purify the
democratic process. Judicial intervention is necessary to
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PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE

protect political speech and participation and to prevent
distortion of the process by majority prejudice, but all in
the name of more perfect majoritarianism.
Opposed as they are on the significance of individual
rights, these two theories share an ambivalent relationship
to the Constitution and the interpretive tradition. Whence
comes the notion that individual autonomy should be protected, or that majoritarian democracy should be purified
but not otherwise limited? Is it just that the Constitution
says so? The Constitution says neither of these things explicitly; and it says both too much and too little to make
either of these views a completely satisfactory reading of
the document as a whole.
On the other hand, if someone claims to read the Constitution as protecting individuality (or purified majoritarianism) because of the independent moral weight of those
values, why does the historical document come into it at
all? Is not every appeal to the Constitution by a proponent
of independently grounded values of autonomy or purified
majoritarianism in some sense mere manipulation of other
people’s allegiance to the Constitution for itself?
We see that the questions raised by the lawyerly approach to judicial review are not so easily avoided. Still,
the competing approaches we have noted alert us to dimensions of the problem not previously apparent. First, if
the justification for judicial review is to promote general
values such as autonomy or purified majoritarianism, that
may help us decide how specific bits of the Constitution
should be interpreted. Second, the tradition may refer to
certain goals—justice, autonomy, democracy—which the
tradition itself views as having a value and grounding outside and independent of the tradition. If the tradition
commands allegiance both to its own specific content and
to external values, it contains within itself the seeds of
possible contradiction. What does faithfulness to the tradition then require?
As of the 1980s, the newest philosophical interest of
academic constitutional lawyers is in hermeneutics.
Whether there are answers here, and whether any such
answers will influence the course of constitutional law, remains to be seen. Hermeneutics may bring new insight
into the various meanings of the idea of operating in a
tradition. Barring some remarkable feat of philosophical
bootstrapping, hermeneutics will not answer the most fundamental philosophical question about constitutional law:
why care about the tradition at all? And there is a final
irony. Because the political community is made up of individuals who must confront this fundamental question,
the community must confront it also, even though from
another perspective it is by shared allegiance to the tradition that the community is defined.
DONALD H. REGAN
(1986)
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